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Musical Copyright Infringement: The Replacement of
A rnstein v. Porter-A More Comprehensive Use of
Expert Testimony and the Implementation
of an "Actual Audience" Test
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, composers have freely copied the musical composi-
tions of their colleagues and of the great masters.' A composer may
seek similarity in his own musical work to that of a pre-existing work
because "only a few [permutations of musical notes] are pleasing; and
much fewer still suit the infantile demands of the popular ear."2 The
emphasis on productivity and professional skill overshadowed the im-
portance of the originality3 of a musical work.4 Borrowing was per-
mitted "so long as the composer used the material to good effect; the
focus was not on the source of the components, but on the quality of
the whole." 5
This practice continues. For example, Paul McCartney has stated
1. A. SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 146 (2d ed. 1932). Shafter notes:
Bach, who would probably turn over in his grave at the knowledge, has fur-
nished the melodic ideas for scores of popular hits he would shudder to hear.
Beethoven, Chopin, Wagner, Liszt-all the great ones have contributed simi-
larly to the unholy prosperity of Tin Pan Alley copyists who possess not a
tithe of their genius or industry.
Id. at 146-47.
2. Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940) (defendant did
not infringe plaintiff's musical composition despite a substantially identical sequence
of eight notes found in defendant's composition). "Reoccurrence [of musical notes] is
not therefore an inevitable badge of plagiarism." Id.
3. An original work need not be novel; rather, the work need only be original to
its creator and, therefore, not copied from another. " 'Original' in reference to a copy-
righted work means that the particular work 'owes its origin' to the 'author.'" Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1883)). "All that
is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the 'author' contrib-
uted something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his
own.' " Id. at 102-03 (footnote omitted) (quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150
F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945)).
"Copyright protection subsists.., in original works of authorship fixed in any tangi-
ble medium of expression .... " 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (successor to
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)).
4. See generally A. SHAFTER, supra note 1, at 147-50.
5. Comment, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 421, 425 (1988) (emphasis in original); see also B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED
that "[the Beatles] were the biggest nickers in town. Plagiarists ex-
traordinaires."6 The copying of musical works has thus been ac-
cepted by some as commonplace. However, today, while a composer
may copy a colleague's work, when that same composer suspects an-
other of copying his own work, the alleged infringer is sued immedi-
ately for copyright infringement. 7 The music industry's tremendous
growth since the late 1970s,8 and the increased revenues from the
creative exploitation of musical works have caused this attitude
change among composers toward the infringement of their
copyright.9
Consequently, musical plagiarism'0 or musical copyright infringe-
ment 1 is the subject of much comment. "The determination of
[copyright] infringement is one of the most difficult of all legal ques-
tions .. ."12 The Second Circuit's 1946 decision in Arnstein v.
Porter13 imposed significant judicial guidelines 14 by limiting the in-
terplay between the use of expert witnesses and the lay listener
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 53 (1967) (advocating "cross-lifting," which is the use of one work
in the creating of a new, independent work).
6. Comment, supra note 5, at 427 n.33.
7. A. SHAFTER, supra note 1, at 146-47.
8. Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music Copyright Infringement Cases,
57 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 127-28 & n.4 (1988); see J. TAUBMAN, IN TUNE WITH THE MU-
SIC BUSINESS 51 (1980) (discussing the rapid growth of the recording industry); H. Vo-
GEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS 156 (1986). A popular song may be
licensed for advertising purposes, such as Kodak's use of Cyndi Lauper's popular song
"True Colors." Technological advances also have increased the potential uses of music.
9. See, e.g., Gaste v. Kaiserman, 683 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). "[T]he jury found
that the song 'Feelings' infringed plaintiffs' copyright in the musical composition 'Pour
Toy' and awarded plaintiffs damages in excess of $500,000." Id. at 64. The defendants'
motion to reduce the jury's award was granted. Id. at 66.
10. Although the terms "plagiarism" and "copyright infringement" are used inter-
changeably, plagiarism most often refers to literary or dramatic copying, whereas copy-
right infringement usually refers to music copying. Plagiarism also refers to an area of
copyright infringement which involves the appropriation of another's work, ideas, or
language-either in whole or part-and passing such work off as the product of one's
own mind. It is not necessary to copy another's work verbatim to be liable for plagia-
rism. Also, plagiarism is not to be confused with the area of copyright infringement
referred to as "piracy," which is the reproduction and sale of unauthorized literal cop-
ies of a work. See generally A. SHAFTER, supra note 1, at 151-54.
11. Copyright infringement refers to a violation of any right granted to a copyright
owner by the Copyright Act of 1976. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982). "[An infringement is
not confined to the literal and exact repetition or reproduction; it includes also the var-
ious modes in which the matter of any work may be adopted, imitated, transferred or
reproduced, with more or less colorable alterations to disguise the piracy." Universal
Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947) (quoting 18 C.J.S.
Copyright and Literary Property § 34, at 217 (1943)). See generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIM.
MER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1][ 2] (1989); A. SHAFTER, supra note 1, at 151-54.
12. A. SHAFTER, supra note 1, at 146.
13. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947); see infra notes 110-
20 and accompanying text.
14. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions for statutory copy-
right infringement, as copyright is governed by federal statute. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914
(1976).
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test' 5 within the framework of musical copyright infringement
litigation.16
Expert witnesses analyze and dissect the original work and the al-
legedly infringing work to ensure that the plaintiff has brought suit
against the proper defendant, and to assist in proving that the de-
fendant has copied the plaintiff's work.17 Experts, however, are used
only in the determination of whether a defendant has copied.' 8 To
prove illicit copying or improper appropriation,19 the trier of fact,
having heard the expert testimony, places itself in the position of the
average lay listener to decide the ultimate issue of copyright infringe-
ment. This issue is whether the defendant's work is substantially
similar 20 to that of the plaintiff and, thus, whether the defendant has
illicitly or improperly copied or appropriated the plaintiff's work.2 '
The use of the lay listener test results from the notion that general
audience reactions are a gauge of whether the defendant has taken
from the plaintiff's work that which is aurally recognizable and
pleasing to those listeners who comprise the plaintiff's target audi-
ence.22 If this is found, the defendant has wrongfully appropriated
the plaintiff's work and liability attaches. 23
Although Arnstein has been followed by the federal courts for over
15. The counterpart of the lay listener test in literary and dramatic plagiarism in-
fringement suits is the average and ordinary lay observer test. Courts have used the
terms "average lay observer," "ordinary reasonable person," "ordinary lay observer,"
or in the context of music, the terms "average lay listener," "average listener," "ordi-
nary lay listener," "spectator reactions," and "the audience test," interchangeably. De-
cisions using the average or ordinary observer test include: Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Star Wars"); Meta-Film Assoc.,
Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346 (C.D. Cal. 1984) ("Animal House"); Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures Int'l, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134 (C.D. Cal., 1982) ("Jaws");
Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, 523 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.
1981) ("Superman").
16. Sections 103 and 106 exclusively govern what constitutes a copyright. 17
U.S.C. §§ 103, 106 (1976). The copyright statute invites incorporation and evolution of
judicial doctrine on the subject of plaintiff's burden of proof regarding copyright in-
fringement. M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.11[D].
17. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
18. Id.
19. These terms are used interchangeably and mean that the defendant copied
illegally.
20. See generally Cohen, Masking Copyright Decision Making: The Meaningless-
ness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719 (1987); Sherman, Musical
Copyright Infringement: The Requirement of Substantial Similarity, 2 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. 81, 94-98 (1977).
21. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69.
22. Id. at 473.
23. Id.
forty years,24 and the general law regarding copyright infringement
is relatively settled,2 5 Arnstein is criticized for its impracticality. 26
Despite judicial agreement that the determination of substantial sim-
ilarity on the issue of improper appropriation is a question of fact,
disagreement remains as to the most effective method of analyzing
this issue. The federal courts have been in conflict over musical com-
parison in copyright infringement litigation for more than a cen-
tury.27 Since Arnstein, this controversy has focused primarily upon
the use of expert witnesses and lay listener reactions within musical
copyright infringement litigation.28
Music has been considered "the most baffling of the arts .... [and
the product of the] most apparently precise and rationale tech-
niques." 29  Consequently, musical copyright infringement analysis
has suffered from "poor legal and musical analysis."30 Because of the
unique nature of music and the recent significant increase in the fi-
nancial stakes surrounding the music industry, the judicial limita-
tions on the use of experts and lay listener reactions as set out in
Arnstein are no longer sufficient. A more reliable means of ascer-
taining musical copyright infringement must be implemented.
Part II of this comment discusses the unique nature of musical
comparison. 31 Part II also suggests that Arnstein's use of experts and
hypothetical lay persons to prove copying and improper appropria-
24. The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984),
demonstrates the federal courts' recent substantial adherence to the principles laid out
in Arnstein.
25. For a plaintiff to bring a copyright infringement suit, three elements must be
proved: (1) the plaintiff's work is his own and, therefore, original and subsequently en-
titled to valid copyright protection; (2) the defendant copied the plaintiff's work; and
(3) the defendant's copying is substantial enough to qualify as infringement, i.e., the
plaintiff must prove illicit copying or improper appropriation. If the plaintiff success-
fully proves these elements, the defendant is liable for copyright infringement. See in-
fra notes 77-109 and accompanying text. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11,
§§ 13.01-.03; W. PATRY, LATMEN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 192-202 (1986).
26. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-
33 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (infringement of computer software
programs). "[T]he distinction between the two parts of the Arnstein test may be of
doubtful value when the finder of fact is the same person for each step . Id. at
1232.
27. See, e.g., Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552) (plain-
tiff, a playwright, who composed and properly copyrighted a dramatic composition en-
titled "Under the Gaslight" was granted an injunction against defendant who partly
copied plaintiff's work in his play "After Dark"); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (No.
4,436), reh'g denied, 8 F. Cas. 626 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,437) (copyright infringe-
ment of plaintiff's book, Emerson's North American Arithmetic).
28. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 20; Orth, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Musical
Infringement Cases, 16 U. PITT. L. REV. 232 (1955); Sorensen & Sorensen, Re-examin-
ing the Traditional Legal Test of Literary Similarity A Proposal for Content Analysis,
37 CORNELL L.Q. 638 (1952).
29. A. COOKE, A GUIDE TO MUSICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1987).
30. Comment, supra note 5, at 463.
31. See infra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
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tion respectively, is inappropriate for musical copyright infringement
litigation.3 2
Part III introduces the Second Circuit's majority decision in Am-
stein. This section includes a complete discussion of how a plaintiff
proves copyright infringement through ownership,33 copying,34 and
improper appropriation, 35 as well as a brief explanation of the way in
which expert witnesses and the lay listener test are used in this pro-
cess. 36 Part III also outlines the Ninth Circuit's attempt to modify
Arnstein and the framework of copyright infringement litigation by
the use of the idea-expression dichotomy, as found in Sid and Marty
Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.37 Krofft's
use of experts and lay listener reactions is rejected as it applies to
musical comparison. 38
Part IV advocates Judge Clark's avid dissent39 in Arnstein. To this
day, Judge Clark's dissatisfaction with the Arnstein formula has con-
siderable merit, especially with regard to musical copyright infringe-
ment litigation.
Part V analyzes the use of experts and, specifically, their role in
musical copyright infringement litigation.40 This section concludes
that the expert is an essential player in the technical comparison of
musical works. Part VI of this comment then discusses the applica-
tion and validity of the lay listener test with regard to musical copy-
right infringement litigation.41
Finally, Part VII proposes modifications to the current musical
copyright infringement litigation framework. This section advocates
a more comprehensive use of expert witnesses in musical copyright
infringement cases and proposes that the trier of fact be presented
with expert testimony, not only on the issue of copying, but also on
the issue of improper appropriation. 42 In the event that the extended
use of expert testimony on the issue of improper appropriation does
32. See infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 79-102 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
37. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
38. See infra notes 121-44 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text; see also Metzger, Name that
Tune: A Proposal for an Intrinsic Test of Musical Plagiarism, 5 Loy. ENT. L.J. 61, 80-
83 (1985); Orth, supra note 28, at 249-57; Sherman, supra note 20, at 94-98.
40. See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 158-76 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
not eliminate the lay listener test, Part VI also proposes that the trier
of fact no longer hypothetically assume the role of a lay listener, but
instead be offered testimony from a sampling of an "actual audience"
of plaintiff's music. 43
II. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF MUSIC AND MUSICAL COMPARISON
A. Music, in a Class by Itself
Music has been described as a science, despite the fact that its es-
sence is "an art and indefinable." 4 4 Justice Holmes has defined a mu-
sical composition as a "rational collocation of sounds apart from
concepts, reduced to a tangible expression from which the collocation
can 'be reproduced either with or without continuous human inter-
vention."45 This definition has been deemed the "classic judicial de-
scription" 46 of music.
Whereas the English language consists of a twenty-six letter al-
phabet, creating a language with hundreds of thousands of words,
music is limited to combinations of chords taken from a scale of only
thirteen notes.4 7 Musical range is further limited because the aver-
age singing voice is only one octave and most musical instruments are
confined to three to five octaves.48 Consequently, there is a limit to
musical expression. It is claimed that all possible combinations of
these thirteen notes already exist in the public domain, and that orig-
inal music can no longer be created.4 9 Difficulty in achieving origi-
nality in a musical work creates equal difficulty in ascertaining
whether a work has been copied. "Practically every original idea the
composer can think of has appeared somewhere before; it is a matter
of probabilities, and every day the number of new possibilities grows
less."50
Because use of musical tones and octaves are limited, composers
turn to the variation of other musical elements to obtain originality.
However, even this is limited. The most basic of these elements are
rhythm, harmony, and melody. "Originality, if it exists, must be
found in one of these."s1 Thus, they are important in musical copy-
right infringement analysis.
43. See infra notes 187-98 and accompanying text.
44. A. SHAFrER, supra note 1, at 154 (citing Bach v. Longman, 1 Chit. 26 (1777);
Dunbar v.. Spratt-Snyder Co., 208 Iowa 490, 226 N.W. 22 (1929)).
45. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 20 (1908) (Holmes,
J., concurring).
46. A. SHAFTER, supra note 1, at 154.
47. See generally id. at 155-69.
48. Id. at 157; Orth, supra note 28, at 234.
49. A. SHAFTER, supra note 1, at 155.
50. Id.
51. Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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Rhythm involves the duration of musical sounds within a musical
composition. It is "time, the beats per bar; everything that can be
checked by the metronome,"5 2 including accent, 53 tempo,5 4 and
meter. 55 An allegedly infringing work may differ in rhythm from
the infringed work, and consequently camouflage an infringement,
creating the appearance of originality. "[O]ne may copy a melody by
changing the rhythm-and still be infringing."56
Melody57 is the arrangement or succession of musical notes which
are "the fingerprints of the composition, and establish its identity."58
In essence, it is the "tune" of a song. A song's melody usually deter-
mines its commercial success or failure.59 There is, however, a limi-
tation of human ingenuity as far as the creation of melody.
Harmony is generally the "blending of tones":60 the formation of
chords and the way in which the tones and chords work together as
accompaniment to melody. "Harmony and melody, inextricably in-
terwoven as they are, usually form the basis of an infringement suit
together."61
Several other elements also contribute to the creation of a musical
work. These include "[t]imbre... [s]patial organization ... rhythm,
phrasing, bass lines, instrumentation and new technological effects,
all of which can play an important role in a song's originality." 62
Originality may be viewed as "a function of the interaction and
52. A. SHAFTER, supra note 1, at 158.
53. "The creation of regularly recurring accents of this type depends on the ma-
nipulation of groups of pitches and chords." HARVARD CONCISE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC
3 (1978) [hereinafter HARVARD]. Thus, placing emphasis on one pitch or chord by ac-
centing notes at regular intervals allows a composer to set the rhythm of a musical
composition. Accents may be strong or weak. Weak accents assist in building rhythm
by creating anticipation for strong accents. Id.
54. Tempo is the pace or rate of speed at which a musical piece is played, deter-
mining the general nature of the piece. Time gives musical works their tempo, 4/4 or
3/4 or 6/8. There are only a limited number of tempos, however, making originality of
tempo rare. Northern Music, 105 F. Supp. at 400; HARVARD, supra note 53, at 504.
55. Meter is rhythm characterized by reoccurrence of a systematic arrangement of
basic musical patterns. "The pattern of fixed tempoed units, called beats.., by which
the time span of a piece of music or a section thereof is measured." HARVARD, supra
note 53, at 308.
56. A. SHAFrER, supra note 1, at 159.
57. A melody consists of a series of tones played in a fixed pattern of pitches and
rhythms; a rhythmic succession of single tones organized as an aesthetic whole.
HARVARD, supra note 53, at 304.
58. Northern Music, 105 F. Supp. at 400.
59. A. SHAFTER, supra note 1, at 164,
60. Northern Music, 105 F. Supp. at 400.
61. A. SHAFrER, supra note 1, at 166.
62. Comment, supra note 5, at 432.
conjunction of these elements than of any element alone; a change in
one element necessarily affects our perception of all others." 63 The
way in which these elements interact creates originality. Two musi-
cal works, in comparison to one another, may sound different when
analysis of only one element which makes up the work may be iden-
tical. This is because listeners "tend not to hear merely acoustical
sounds per se, but rather structural relations among sounds." 64 Al-
teration of a single element can affect these structural relations.65
These subtle technical intricacies between two compared works are
difficult to recognize.
B. Musical Comparison in Musical Copyright Infringement
Litigation
"Of all the arts, music is perhaps the least tangible."66 Due to the
limited amount of musical permutations, music has a "self-plagiarist
nature."67 Consequently, musical copyright infringement is difficult
to detect. There is a limited amount of information upon which a
trier of fact may determine infringement of a musical work because
music is aurally perceived, not visually perceived. Therefore, a trier
of fact may only consider similarity of musical expression, as opposed
to comparison of ideas, such as in comparing works for literary or
dramatic plagiarism.
As a rational collocation,68 music is the result of the various ele-
ments discussed above, intentionally placed together in a specific
manner. As Justice Holmes pointed out, music is "apart from con-
cepts."69 Because music is aurally perceived, it "is incapable of inde-
pendently communicating ideas.. ."70 As a result, only comparisons
of the similarity of the expression of a musical work are possible.
Music is, in fact, a product of impressions which influence human
sensibilities because it is addressed solely to the aural sense. How-
ever, the aural musical sense of most individuals is undeveloped.
Only those who pursue an education in musical theory or composi-
tion acquire the knowledge necessary to make a true musical compar-
ison. Consequently, the lay listener has an untutored ear and is
musically illiterate.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 434 (emphasis in original).
65. Id.
66. Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1956) (corporate defendant's publi-
cation in 1951 of plaintiff's musical composition "My God and I," copyrighted in 1935,
was an infringement of plaintiff's song (words and music)).
67. Metzger, supra note 39, at 70.
68. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
69. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 20 (1908) (Holmes,
J., concurring); see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
70. Metzger, supra note 39, at 69.
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The self-plagiaristic nature of music necessitates a reevaluation of
the legal analysis used in copyright infringement cases involving mu-
sical comparison. Copyright law must adjust to the imprecise and yet
technical nature of music. 71 Under the static law of Arnstein,
whether a defendant has improperly appropriated a plaintiff's work
is decided by the untutored, illiterate lay ear of the trier of fact.72
Testimony by musical experts, who truly have "tutored" ears and are
fully literate in musical comparison, is prohibited on this issue.73
Indeed, the determination of the existence of substantial similarity
and, thus, improper appropriation rests on the trier of fact's interpre-
tation of whether the lay listener would find substantial similarity
between the alleged infringing work and plaintiff's complaining
work. It seems ludicrous that in an area clearly involving technical
subject matter that the federal courts continue to idly apply the lay
listener test even though the trier of fact is devoid of the proper lis-
tening skills necessary to make a comparison between musical works.
After the trier of fact decides, with the aid of experts, whether the
two musical works are substantially similar, it is left, without contin-
ued expert assistance, to decide whether the defendant has illicitly or
improperly copied the plaintiff's work. This ultimate issue is thus
decided by a trier of fact who may be unfamiliar with the style of
music which is the subject of the litigation.
The unique nature of musical comparison requires that the federal
courts adopt a more precise and effective method in their use of ex-
pert witnesses and the lay listener test in determining alleged copy-
right infringement of musical compositions. However, before
proceeding further, it is necessary to outline how a plaintiff proves
copyright infringement, and review the Second Circuit's decision in
Arnstein v. Porter,74 as well as the Ninth Circuit's more recent deci-
sion in Sid and Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDon-
ald's Corp.75 Krofft unsuccessfully attempts to modify the Arnstein
approach through its application of the idea-expression dichotomy to
copyright infringement litigation.76
71. Comment, supra note 5, at 464.
72. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851
(1947).
73. Id.
74. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
75. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
76. Id. at 1167-68.
III. THE FRAMEWORK OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION
AND THE LIMITATIONS OF ARNSTEIN V. PORTER
A. Proving Copyright Infringement
1. Ownership
In musical copyright infringement litigation, the plaintiff must first
establish ownership of a valid copyright in his work.7 7 However, this
is not a difficult requirement to fulfill. A copyright certificate of re-
gistration made before or within five years of first publication of the
work is prima facie evidence of the copyright's validity and the plain-
tiff's ownership.78
2. Copying
Once the plaintiff proves ownership, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant copied the plaintiff's work. Proof of copying is essen-
tial to any claim of copyright infringement. If the defendant did not
copy the complaining work, then no infringement has occurred.79
Because infringers are "rarely caught red handed,"80 direct evidence
of copying8 l is seldom possible.8 2 The federal courts have thus ap-
proved the use of indirect proof to show copying.8 3
Indirect copying occurs when the defendant has had access to the
77. See, e.g., Spectravest, Inc. v. Mervyn's, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1486, 1490 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (citing Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162) (plaintiff awarded profits of $54,000, permanent
injunctive relief, and reasonable costs and attorney's fees for defendant's continued use
of plaintiff's fabric design).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982). Melville Nimmer states that proof of ownership in-
cludes: "[O]riginality [of the work] in the author; copyrightability of subject matter; cit-
izenship status of the author such as to permit a claim of copyright; compliance with
applicable statutory formalities; and, (if the plaintiff is not the author) transfer of
rights ... between the author and the plaintiff .... " 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11,
§ 13.01[A], at 13-4 (footnotes omitted); see Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584
F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1978).
79. Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, motion to set aside de-
cree denied, 86 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1936) (plaintiff lost appeal of decree dismissing suit for
copyright infringement).
80. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988).
81. Direct evidence of copying, though rare, would consist of proof that the de-
fendant had the plaintiff's work in his possession or had seen it at one time before
creating his own work. Direct copying may be found where a plaintiff's song has been
widely disseminated, such as by publication of sheet music, public broadcast, or distri-
bution. See Ferguson, 584 F.2d at 113; Cholvin v. B. & F. Music Co., 253 F.2d 102, 103
(7th Cir. 1958); Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177,
179 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
82. Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 815 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("It is
rarely possible for a plaintiff to muster direct proof of copying."); Testa v. Janssen, 492
F. Supp. 198, 202 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (because direct evidence of copying is seldom found,
proof of copying is found if defendant had access to the copyrighted work and it is sub-
stantially similar to that work); Whitney v. Ross Jungnickel, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 751, 753
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
83. See Gaste, 863 F.2d at 1066; Benson v. Coca-Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973, 974 (11th
Cir. 1988); Evans, 681 F. Supp. at 816.
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plaintiff's work and substantial similarity8 4 exists between them.
Access may be proved by demonstrating that the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to view or copy plaintiff's work.8 5 A reason-
able opportunity means neither the "bare possibility"8 6 of access nor
the inference of access through mere speculation or conjecture.87 For
example, evidence that the plaintiff's work is physically in the same
location as the alleged infringer does not create a reasonable opportu-
nity to view and, therefore, does not constitute access.88 Access, then,
may be proved indirectly if the defendant has had an opportunity to
view or copy the plaintiff's work, but this opportunity must be more
than a bare possibility.
Absent proof of access, copying also may be proved indirectly if the
similarity between the plaintiff's work and the allegedly infringing
work is striking.89 Striking similarity is defined as the finding of
some characteristic in both works which "preclude[s] the possibility
that the defendant independently arrived at the same result."90 A
plaintiff must demonstrate that "such similarities are of a kind that
can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, in-
dependent creation or prior common source." 91 Striking similarity is
not simply the' matching of identical notes in two similar composi-
tions.92 Important factors in determining the degree of similarity in-
clude: the uniqueness of the sections of the work, an unexpected
84. The term "substantial similarity," used here in reference to proof of copying, is
not the same as the use of the term in reference to proof of improper appropriation.
85. See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (access occurs if "a reason-
able possibility [exists] that the complaining work was available to the alleged in-
fringer") (emphasis in original); Testa, 492 F. Supp. at 202 (citing Universal Athletic
Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 340 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 511 F.2d
904 (3d Cir. 1975)).
86. Testa, 492 F. Supp. at 203 (citing Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584
F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978)).
87. See id. at 202; Scott v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 449 F. Supp. 518, 520 (D.D.C.
1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S 849 (1980).
88. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Krasna, 65 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 271
A.D. 1008, 69 N.Y.S.2d 796 (App. Div. 1947).
89. See M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.02[B], at 13-14 to 13-15; see also Baxter v.
MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 424 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).
90. See M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.02[B], at 13-15; see also Doran v. Sunset
House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 948 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir.
1962) ("[A]ccess is but a means of eliminating coincidence or independent effort as an
explanation for likeness between the copyrighted article and the infringing article
.... "). See generally Sherman, supra note 20 (similarities may be so idiosyncratic as to
be considered striking).
91. Stratchborneo v. Arc Car Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(citation omitted).
92. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 903 (7th Cir. 1984).
departure from the normal metric structure,93 common errors, 94 par-
ticularly intricate similarities95  and, occasionally, suspicious
dissimilarities.96
Two views exist regarding one work's striking similarity to an-
other. To eliminate the possibility that an unsuccessful composer is
denied a remedy, because his unknown status precludes a finding of
access, 97 some courts have held that the defendant's access may be
proved when the similarity between the plaintiff's and the defend-
ant's work is both substantial and striking. In this situation, the
"trier of fact may be permitted to infer copying notwithstanding the
plaintiff's failure to prove access." 98
The Seventh Circuit rejected this inference in Selle v. Gibb.99 Selle
states that when striking similarity is at issue, "there must be at least
some other evidence that would establish a 'reasonable possibility'
that the plaintiff's work was available to the alleged infringer."'10
Striking similarity is seen as only one piece of circumstantial evi-
dence tending to show access; therefore, it must not be considered "in
isolation."1o1 Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit, despite the
presence of striking similarity, a plaintiff must still demonstrate that
the inference of access is reasonable. 0 2
93. Id. at 904; see, e.g., Nordstrom v. Radio Corp. of Am., 251 F. Supp. 41, 42 (D.
Colo. 1965).
94. See, e.g., Nordstrom, 251 F. Supp. at 42.
95. Selle, 741 F.2d at 904 (citations omitted).
96. Id.; see, e.g., Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144, 146 (2d
Cir. 1956) ("[T]he inversion of certain words or the substitution of one word for an-
other... [is a] crude effort to give the appearance of dissimilarity ...."); see also Sher-
man, supra note 20, at 84-88.
97. It is very difficult for an unknown composer to prove that his work has been
viewed by anyone because his work is unknown and not well distributed.
98. M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.02[B], at 13-14 (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted); see also Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir.
1978); Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1946); Evans v. Wal-
lace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Fla. 1988). Allowing inference of access per-
mits the finder of fact to find "an ultimate fact to be true upon proof of another fact if
upon consideration of all of the circumstances revealed by the evidence [it is] satisfied
that in logic and common experience the ultimate fact is more likely than not to fol-
low from the fact proved." Selle v. Gibb, 567 F. Supp. 1173, 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd,
741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
99. 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
100. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (citing
Selle, 741 F.2d at 901).
101. Selle, 741 F.2d at 901. "[A]lthough proof of striking similarity may permit an
inference of access, the plaintiff must still meet some minimum threshold of proof
which demonstrates that the inference of access is reasonable." Id. at 902; accord
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 716 (1946).
102. As Meville Nimmer pointed out, the Selle court stated that:
[E]ven if the similarity is verbatim this may not constitute striking similarity
if that which is common between the two works is commonplace.... In such
circumstances the similarity between the two works may be explained by a
common source, or even by coincidental similarity .... This means that evi-
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3. Improper Appropriation
Only after copying has been established does the issue of improper
appropriation arise. 1 03 Copying is permissible unless proved to be il-
licit or improper. 0 4 To prove improper appropriation, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant's infringement is "substantial and ma-
terial enough .. . to constitute an unlawful appropriation,"105 and
that the works are substantially similar.
Substantial similarity lies somewhere between no similarity and lit-
eral similarity. Justice Learned Hand once stated "wherever [the
line] . . . is drawn, will seem arbitrary" 0 6 and that "the test for in-
fringement of a copyright is of necessity vague."'107 Professor Mel-
ville Nimmer has stated that "the determination of the extent of
similarity which will constitute a substantial and hence infringing
similarity presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright
law . . . ."108 Yet, the level of similarity which is deemed substantial
dence of striking similarity must include "some testimony or other evidence of
the relative complexity or uniqueness of the two compositions."
3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.02[B], at 13-18 (quoting Selle, 741 F.2d at 905).
103. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851
(1947).
104. Although two works may in fact be identical in every detail, if the alleged in-
fringer created his work independently, or if both works were copied from a common
source available in the public domain, there is no illicit copying or improper appropria-
tion, and therefore, no infringement. Such copying is permissible. Consequently, a
presumption of infringement may be rebutted by proof of independent creation or
common source defense. In proving independent creation, one must consider the "de-
fendant's training, his past conduct in independently creating works, or conversely, his
record of copying." M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.01[B], at 13-8 (footnotes omitted).
Unconscious copying, however, is not a defense to copyright infringement. In
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997-99 (2d Cir. 1983), the
court found that there had been a copyright infringement based upon a theory of sub-
conscious copying. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F.
Supp. 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1924).
105. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 466.
106. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931).
107. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
The definition of "substantial" varies from case to case, and the Copyright Act of 1976
offers no guidance. Note, Copyright: Hollywood v. Substantial Similarity, 32 OKLA L.
REV. 177, 177 (1979).
108. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.03[A], at 13-20 (emphasis in original); see E.E.
Johnson Co. v. Uriden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (D. Minn. 1985). For ex-
ample, the courts in Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir.), on
remand, 261 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), and Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prod. Div. of
General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), both misapplied the
bifurcated analysis of Arnstein as a "single lay observer test for substantial similarity."
This is an example of the misunderstanding of the term "substantial similarity."
enough to constitute improper appropriation depends upon the im-
pression made by the protected material upon the trier of fact as a
lay listener for whom the work has been created. If the plaintiff fails
to prove improper appropriation, the defendant's alleged copying is
then permissible.109
B. Limitations Placed Upon Proof of Copyright Infringement:
Arnstein v. Porter
In 1946, Arnstein v. Porter"O provided the Second Circuit with the
"opportunity to expound on, formulate and perhaps make sense of
the requirements and applicable standards for infringement ac-
tions.""' The distinction between copying and improper appropria-
tion as developed in Arnstein resulted in the judicial modification
and refinement of guidelines determining the permissible scope of
expert testimony and the lay listener test in both musical copyright
infringement cases and copyright infringement litigation generally.112
Arnstein provided the avenue for expert witnesses to play a signifi-
cant role in establishing the element of copying.113 Expert dissec-
109. Permissible copying includes the copying of an idea, de minimis copying, or the
fair use of plaintiff's work. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
110. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947). Arnstein marked
the sixth case in which Arnstein brought suit for copyright infringement; it concerned
the alleged infringement by Cole Porter of six songs composed by Arnstein. It was the
first musical plagiarism case since Reed v. Carusi, 20 F. Cas. 431 (C.C. Md. 1845) (No.
11,642), in which a plaintiff requested a jury trial. Also, it was the first instance that
an appellate court had reversed the lower court. After five unsuccessful cases, Arn-
stein brought his cause before a jury. However, the jury found against him and dis-
missed his complaint.
An important aspect of this musical copyright infringement case involved the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, which was resolved in Arnstein's favor. The
court held that where "there is the slightest doubt as to the facts" of whether "there is
enough evidence of access to permit the case to go to jury" and whether "similarities
... are sufficient so that... the jury may properly infer the similarities did not result
from coincidence," summary judgment is improper. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69 (cita-
tions omitted). This "slightest doubt standard" regarding summary judgment proceed-
ings has been recently disapproved by several courts. See, e.g., Ferguson v. National
Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978); Testa v. Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198,
203 n.5 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Scott v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 449 F. Supp. 518, 520
(D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem. 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849
(1980).
The first five Arnstein cases which went to trial were found to lack merit: Arnstein
v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 137 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1943); Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Mu-
sic Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936); Arnstein v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 52
F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Arnstein v. ASCAP, 29 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Arn-
stein v. Nathaniel Skilkert, No. 8152 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1933). For a more complete
discussion of these cases, see Orth, supra note 28.
111. Note, supra note 8, at 130.
112. The Arnstein bifurcated test was opposed 13 years earlier in Harold Lloyd
Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 23 (9th Cir. 1933); see Note, supra note 107 (additional infor-
mation on bifurcated tests).
113. After the Arnstein decision, experts were approved in literary infringement
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tion"l4 and analysis115 on the issue of copying aid the trier of fact in
deciding whether the defendant had access to plaintiff's work, and
whether the two works are similar. In addition, when the plaintiff
dispenses with the direct proof of access and instead proves striking
similarity, expert testimony to prove copying is often "required."'11 6
Striking similarity is an extremely technical aspect of proof used to
find copying. Consequently, experts are solely qualified to handle
the striking similarity comparison. Expert testimony is not admissi-
ble, however, on the issue of improper appropriation-the "ultimate
issue in musical plagiarism cases." 117 The Arnstein court stated:
The impression made on the refined ears of musical experts or their views
as to the musical excellence of plaintiff's or defendant's works are utterly im-
material on the issue of misappropriation; for the views of such persons are
caviar to the general--and plaintiff's and defendant's compositions are not
caviar. 11
8
Arnstein qualified the response of the lay listener, as perceived by
the trier of fact, as the deciding factor in determining whether a de-
fendant's copying was substantial and material enough to qualify as
improper appropriation and, therefore, as infringement. The Second
Circuit stated in Arnstein that the key issue regarding improper ap-
propriation is "whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise
the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defend-
ant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the
plaintiff."119
The trier of fact, therefore, determines the issue of improper ap-
propriation based on a "hypothetical lay listener's aural compari-
son."120 The trier of fact measures a hypothetical lay listener's
cases. See Bullen, The Role of Literary Experts in Plagiarism Trials, 7 AM. U.L. REV.
55, 62-63 (1958).
114. Dissection of music is defined as the "cutting up of the musical work into
smaller units for the purpose of music analysis." Note, supra note 8, at 131 n.34.
115. Expert analysis of music is the "study of a composition with regard to form,
structure, thematic material, harmony, melody, phrasing, orchestration, style, tech-
nique, etc." HARVARD DICTIONARY OF Music 36 (1961). An in depth discussion of mu-
sical dissection and analysis is beyond the scope of this article; however, for further
information, see generally A. COOKE, supra note 29; A. SHAFTER, supra note 1.
116. Testa v. Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198, 203 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
117. Metzger, supra note 39, at 71.
118. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851
(1947) (footnotes omitted). However, a plaintiff may call expert witnesses to aid the
trier of fact in reaching its conclusion as to the responses of lay listeners and to predict
and interpret possible spectator reactions. Id.
119. Id. (footnote omitted).
120. Note, supra note 8, at 132.
perception by assuming the level of dissection in which a lay listener
engages. Based on this, the trier of fact supposedly gains an impres-
sion as to whether the defendant has materially and substantially
copied the plaintiff's work so that the plaintiff's audience would buy
the defendant's work over that of the plaintiff's. If this has occurred,
the defendant has improperly appropriated the plaintiff's work.
C. Krofft's Idea-Expression Dichotomy and Its Misapplication to
Musical Copyright Infringement
In Sid and Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDon-
ald's Corp.,121 the Ninth Circuit devised a two-tiered copyright in-
fringement analysis purportedly based, in part, on the bifurcated
infringement analysis of Arnstein. 122 The Krofft decision was based
upon the idea-expression dichotomy.12 3 Though Arnstein was viewed
121. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). In 1968, the National Broadcasting Company ap-
proached Sid and Marty Krofft to create a children's television program. They spent
the following year creating "H.R. Pufnstuf," which was broadcast on NBC in Septem-
ber of 1969. The series generated a line of products and endorsements.
In 1970, Marty Krofft was contacted by an executive from Needham, Harper &
Steers, Inc., an advertising agency, who asked whether the Kroffts were interested in
working together to procure an advertising account from McDonald's. Needham
wanted to base its advertising campaign for McDonald's on the "H.R. Pufnstuf" char-
acters.
The two worked together for a while, until Marty Krofft was notified by Needham
that the McDonald's campaign had been cancelled. Needham, however, was deceiving
the Kroffts. The McDonald's advertising account had already been awarded to the
Needham agency. In fact, Needham hired former employees of the Kroffts to design
costumes and to construct sets for McDonaldland, and also hired the same voice expert
who worked on the Kroftt "H.R. Pufnstuf" characters.
The first McDonaldland commercials were broadcast in January 1971. The Kroffts
filed suit in September 1971, seeking compensatory damages in the amount of $25,000,
and an order for an accounting of profits attributable to the infringements, or in the
alternative, statutory damages. The plaintiffs were awarded damages of $50,000. The
district court, however, denied plaintiffs' claim for additional monetary recovery in the
form of profits or statutory "in lieu" damages. The Ninth Circuit reversed, remanded
the case for an accounting, and directed that the district court could, in its own discre-
tion, award statutory "in lieu" damages. Id. at 1161-62, 1178.
122. As indicated in Arnstein, the elements required to prove copyright infringe-
ment are: (1) ownership, (2) access (including similarity evidencing copying), and (3)
improper appropriation. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. However, according to Krofft, the
necessary elements are: (1) ownership, (2) access, (3) substantial similarity of ideas,
and (4) substantial similarity of expression of those ideas. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162,
1164.
123. The Copyright Act of 1976 adopted the judicially created idea-expression di-
chotomy, which is essentially the distinction between "idea" and "expression." An
idea is not protected, whereas the expression of an idea is protected. See, e.g., Nichols
v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902
(1931).
The idea-expression dichotomy has been criticized because it was developed under
more narrow statutes which have since been broadened. See, e.g., Collins, Some Obso-
lescent Doctrines of Copyright Law, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 127 (1928). The criticism tends
to be more toward the application of the idea-expression dichotomy than to the theory
itself.
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as good law,124 Krofft did not "resurrect the Arnstein approach ...
[but instead] formulate[d] an extrinsic-intrinsic test for infringement
based on the idea-expression dichotomy."125 The Ninth Circuit sug-
gests that the Arnstein court was "alluding to the idea-expression di-
chotomy"126 in its decision.
The extrinsic test addresses whether the ideas of two works are
substantially similar. 127 The test focuses upon specific criteria such
as "the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject mat-
ter and the setting for the subject ... [as well as] analytic discretion
and expert testimony" to determine if there is substantial similarity
in ideas. 128 If no similarities exist in the ideas of the compared
works, no infringement has occurred.
However, if substantial similarity of ideas is found, the intrinsic
test is then applied. The intrinsic test addresses whether the tangible
expression of the compared works is substantially similar.129 The
test relies upon the subjective response of the "ordinary reasonable
person"'1 30 to detect the presence of substantial similarity in expres-
sion. Here, there is no external criterion or expert analysis in the an-
alytical process requiring the trier of fact to decide by itself whether
substantial similarity exists in the expression of the ideas, so as to
constitute infringement.131
Krofft attempted a "bold refinement"132 of Arnstein. However, the
idea-expression dichotomy, which is tenuous at best, is not adaptable
to musical copyright infringement litigation. In fact, courts other
than the Ninth Circuit generally have not adopted the Krofft ap-
proach. 133 Although most musical copyright infringement cases ig-
124. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165.
125. Id. at 1165 n.7.
126. Id. at 1165.
127. Id. at 1164-65. The extrinsic test is extrinsic "because it depends not on the
responses of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed."
Id. at 1164.
128. Id.; 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.03[E], at 13-56.
129. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164; see also Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). "To constitute infringement of expression, the
total concept and feel of the works must be substantially similar." Id. at 1357.
130. Note, supra note 8, at 137 (citing Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164).
131. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164; 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.03[E], at 13-56.
132. Note, supra note 8, at 135.
133. The only case outside of the Ninth Circuit which follows Krofft is MGM, Inc.
v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Prods., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (defendant's
"Scarlett Fever," asserted as a parody of "Gone With the Wind," infringed plaintiff's
copyright in the novel and film, "Gone With the Wind").
nore Krofft,134 Krofft is the law of the Ninth Circuit and,
consequently, will be applied in musical copyright infringement cases
in that circuit.
One Ninth Circuit musical copyright infringement case following
Krofft is Baxter v. MCA, Inc.135 In Baxter, the defendants conceded
their access to the plaintiff's musical composition and that substan-
tial similarity existed between the ideas in the two works, but they
contended that there was no substantial similarity of expression of
ideas.136 The Ninth Circuit recognized that "[d]eterminations of sub-
stantial similarity of expression [in music] are subtle and com-
plex,"137 and that "no bright line rule exists."138
The Baxter court, however, adhered to the Krofft guidelines re-
garding expert dissection analysis and the response of the ordinary
lay listener. The Ninth Circuit did not address the fact that ideas do
not directly exist in musical compositions. Indeed, the Baxter analy-
sis assumed the idea-expression dichotomy as a matter of legal the-
ory, despite the fact that there simply is no "idea" or "expression" to
be distinguished within musical compositions. 139
In addition, Arnstein and Krofft clearly view the role of expert wit-
nesses differently. In Krofft, expert analysis goes to the determina-
tion of whether substantial similarity of ideas exists between two
works.14o Alternatively, Arnstein states that expert testimony may
be considered on the issue of copying, thus identifying similarities
through proof of access which evidences copying.141 In Krofft, expert
testimony is relevant only to show substantial similarity of expres-
134. See, e.g., Benson v. Coca-Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973 (11th Cir. 1986); Selle v. Gibb,
567 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984); Testa v. Janssen,
492 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. Pa. 1980). But see Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 346 (1987) (following Krofft).
135. 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff Leslie Baxter and defendant John Wil-
liams, a successful composer and conductor of music, had known each other for many
years. Baxter was the sole owner of all rights to the title and interest in the copyright
to "Joy," the musical composition which was the subject of this litigation. In the
1960's, Williams "participated as the pianist in the orchestra for a public performance
of 'Joy'." Id. at 422. In 1982, Williams composed the "Theme from E.T." in the motion
picture, "E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial." In 1983, Baxter filed a complaint for copyright
infringement, alleging that the "Theme from E.T." was largely copied from his copy-
righted song "Joy." In September 1984, the defendants moved for summary judgment
on the ground that as a matter of law, the "Theme from E.T." was not substantially
similar to the protected expression in "Joy" and, therefore, did not infringe it. The
district court granted summary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the proceedings. Id. at 422-23, 425.
136. Id. at 423.
137. Id. at 424.
138. Id. at 425.
139. Comment, supra note 5, at 443.
140. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
141. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851
(1947).
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sion of ideas;142 whereas, Arnstein's use of expert testimony should
never be considered on the finding of substantial similarity and the
issue of improper appropriation.143
The idea-expression dichotomy, therefore, does not have any logi-
cal application to musical compositions, and the question as to what
part of a song's music is "idea" and what part is "expression" re-
mains. The Krofft and Baxter decisions have no relevance to either
musical compositions or other works of authorship which do not com-
municate ideas. As one commentator stated, "[m]usic does not com-
municate ideas, but engenders impressions among its listeners."'144
IV. JUDGE CLARK'S DISSENT IN ARNSTEIN V. PORTER
Judge Clark was outraged at his colleagues for disregarding expert
testimony to prove improper appropriation in Arnstein. 45 The ma-
jority opinion of Judge Frank and Judge Learned Hand suggested
that the assistance of musical experts was "utterly immaterial" 4 6 in
proving improper appropriation. However, Judge Clark stated that
the disregard for musical expert testimony on the issue of improper
appropriation represented "the anti-intellectual and book-burning
nature of [the majority's] decision."147
Judge Clark also questioned the capabilities of a jury to settle is-
sues of infringement and, specifically, questions of musical compari-
son without proper training and qualification in the particular artistic
area.148 He argued that reliance upon the ordinary lay listener to de-
cide the issue of illicit copying was the complete antithesis of the use
of expert witnesses in the issue of copying.149 He stated that "[i]f...
142. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
143. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
144. Metzger, supra note 39, at 68.
145. The most frequently quoted section of Judge Clark's dissenting opinion in
Arnstein is the following:
I find nowhere any suggestion of two steps in adjudication of this issue, one of
finding copying which may be approached with musical intelligence and assist-
ance of experts, and another that of illicit copying which must be approached
with complete ignorance; nor do I see how rationally there can be any such
difference, even if a jury-the now chosen instrument of musical detection-
could be expected to separate those issues and the evidence accordingly....
This is a single deduction to be made intelligently, not two with the dominat-
ing one to be made blindly.
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 476 n.1 (Clark, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 478 (Clark, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 479 (Clark, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 478 (Clark, J., dissenting).
all decisions of musical plagiarism [are to be] made by ear, the more
unsophisticated and musically naive the better, then it seems ... we
are reversing our own precedents to substitute chaos, judicial as well
as musical. 15o
Judge Clark's dissent in Arnstein was echoed in his concurring
opinion in Heim v. Universal Pictures Co.,151 decided five days after
Arnstein. It drew attention to, and cast significant doubt upon, the
Second Circuit's analysis and conclusions regarding the use of expert
witnesses and the lay listener test in musical copyright infringement
litigation. This doubt remains today.
V. THE EXPERT WITNESS
Judge Clark was clearly an advocate of using expert testimony in
determining the issue of copying in musical copyright infringement
litigation as set forth by the Arnstein majority. The federal courts
continue to cite the Arnstein guidelines for expert testimony and its
effectiveness in determining copyright infringement. 152 The use of
expert testimony in proof of copying has been "a progressive ... step
toward the circumspect jurisprudence advocated by Judge Clark."153
Judge Learned Hand, however, has expressed disagreement with
the use of experts in copyright cases.154 While presiding over the
Second Circuit, Judge Hand stated:
The testimony of an expert upon [copyright infringement], especially his
cross-examination, greatly extends the trial and contributes nothing which
cannot be better heard after the evidence is all submitted. It ought not to be
allowed at all; and while its admission is not a ground for reversal, it cumbers
the case and tends to confusion, for the more the court is led into the intrica-
cies of ... craftsmanship, the less likely it is to stand upon the firmer, if more
naive, ground of its considered impressions upon its own perusal. We hope
that in this class of cases such evidence may in the future be entirely ex-
cluded, and the case confined to the actual issues; that is, whether the copy-
righted work was original, and whether the defendant copied it, so far as the
supposed infringement is identical.
15 5
Perhaps Judge Hand meant only to bar the use of expert witnesses
150. Id. at 480 (Clark, J., dissenting).
151. 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946). In Heim, Clark once again expressed his vehement
opinion regarding the majority's bifurcated test announced in Arnstein:
[T]he issue is no longer one of musical similarity or identity to justify the con-
clusion of copying-an issue to be decided with all the intelligence, musical as
well as legal, we can bring to bear upon it-but is one, first, of copying, to be
decided more or less intelligently, and, second, of illicit copying, to be decided
blindly on a mere cacophony of sounds.
Id. at 491 (Clark, J., concurring).
152. See Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988); Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896
(7th Cir. 1984).
153. Metzger, supra note 39, at 88.
154. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
155. Id. at 123.
[Vol. 17: 493, 1990] Musical Copyright Infringement
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
from literary and dramatic plagiarism, as the trier of fact has the
complete capability to deal with the nontechnical nature of literary
or dramatic plagiarism. The trier of fact, however, is generally not
literate in the technical and theoretical nature of music and, there-
fore, is absolutely dependent upon the admission of expert testimony
in musical copyright infringement litigation.
Due to the necessity of a visual examination of a musical composi-
tion's tangible expression, the musical literacy of an expert is indis-
pensable. Indeed, "[w]ithout the benefit of expert analysis and
dissection, the fact-finder is ill-equipped"156 to detect significant sub-
stantial similarity in comparing two musical compositions. 157 Conse-
quently, expert testimony in musical infringement litigation is
accepted and supported by the federal judicial system and most legal
critics.
VI. THE LAY LISTENER TEST
The lay listener test has drawn the most criticism in musical copy-
right infringement litigation. 5 8 However, before addressing this is-
sue, the test's mechanics and origin must be understood. The
Arnstein majority clearly explained the policy supporting the average
lay listener test: "The plaintiff's legally protected interest is not, as
such, his reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential fi-
nancial returns from his compositions which derive from the lay pub-
lic's approbation of his efforts."'159 Therefore, the "proper criterion
on .. . [the issue of improper appropriation] is not an analytic or
other comparison of the respective musical compositions as they ap-
pear on paper or in the judgment of trained musicians." 16 0
Instead, the average lay listener test first rests upon the impression
which the stolen musical composition carries to the average lay
ear.161 The test then requires the trier of fact to decide whether the
defendant appropriated from the plaintiff's work that which is famil-
156. Note, supra note 8, at 146.
157. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
158. See generally Metzger, supra note 39; Comment, supra note 5; Note, supra
note 8; Note, Copyright Inrqingement Actions: The Proper Role for the Audience Reac-
tions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1981) [hereinafter
Copyright Infringement Actions].
159. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851
(1947) (footnote omitted).
160. Id. (footnote omitted).
161. Arnstein v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), affd,
137 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1943).
iar to a lay listener who is a member of plaintiff's potential general
audience. If so, the defendant improperly copied the plaintiff's
work.162 Liability for musical copyright infringement attaches only
when the lay listener perceives substantial similarity among the
works being compared.
The "sine qua non of the ordinary ... [lay listener] test ... is the
overall similarities rather than the minute differences between the
two works."163 Consequently, advocates of the lay listener test be-
lieve that unless an infringement is recognizable by the lay listener,
the infringement is not substantial enough to matter 164 and, thus, the
plaintiff's suit for copyright infringement lacks merit.165
The average lay listener test partially owes its origin to the reason-
able person doctrine. Much of the criticism surrounding the test
drises because of the improper adaptation of that doctrine to copy-
right law.166 In other areas of the law, a trier of fact compares a de-
fendant's actions with what a reasonable person would have done
under the circumstances surrounding the defendant at the time and
place of the incident. Although the lay listener test requires the trier
of fact to decide whether the defendant substantially or materially
copied from the plaintiff, it does not require the trier of fact to decide
what a resonable person in the defendant's position would have done.
Indeed, the lay listener test requires the trier to assume the identity
of one familiar enough with the plaintiff's music that he would buy
the defendant's musical composition instead of the plaintiff's, think-
ing it was, in fact, the plaintiff's because of the substantial similarity
between the two works.167
In musical copyright infringement litigation, the trier of fact can
only inquire whether the result of the defendant's work gives the ap-
pearance of having been copied from the plaintiff. This is, therefore,
the 'trier of fact's opinion as to the lay listener's impression of effect,
not of effect itself.168
This basic, yet substantial flaw in the lay listener test has been "ex-
plained by Professor Melville Nimmer:
[T]here can be no dispute that the "spontaneous and immediate" reactions of
the ordinary observer are relevant evidence in determining the existence of
162. Id.
163. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (emphasis in original) (rejected district court's
rationale focusing on dissimilarities).
164. Knowles & Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft' An Expression of New Ideas in Copy-
right?, 8 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 109, 142 (1980).
165. Id.
166. Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1938); Shel-
don v. MGM Pictures Corp., 7 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), rev'd, 8 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.
1956); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.03[E], at 13-50.
167. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.03[E], at 13-50.
168. Id.
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copying. There is, however, reason to dispute the doctrine in so far as it
makes the visceral reactions of the trier the ultimate test of copying (assuming
access). The Copyright Act is intended to protect writers from the theft of the
fruits of their labor, not to protect against the general public's "spontaneous
and immediate" impression that the fruits have been stolen. To be sure the
ordinary observer's impression that there has been a theft is important evi-
dence in establishing that in fact there was a theft, but the two are not the
same.
1 6 9
The lay listener test also receives criticism as a result of its associa-
tion with the 1868 case of Daly v. Palmer.170 The federal courts have
mistakenly pointed to Daly by misinterpreting its case law precedent
and dictum as being the origin of the lay listener test. In Daly, the
Second Circuit stated that copyright infringement or piracy occurs "if
the appropriated series of events . . . is recognized by the spectator,
through any of the senses to which the representation is addressed,
as conveying substantially the same impressions to, and exciting the
same emotions in, the mind, in the same sequence or order."171 This
only reveals the Second Circuit's opinion that the copyright infringe-
ment involved in Daly was so substantial as to be apparent even to
the spectator.
However, the Second Circuit's intention in Daly was not to develop
a copyright infringement test based on lay spectator impressions.
This reality is emphasized by the fact that the court was actually ad-
vocating the derivation test,172 not a lay spectator/listener test:
The true test of whether there is piracy or not, is to ascertain whether there is
servile or evasive imitation of the plaintiff's work, or whether there is a bo-
nafide original compilation, made up from common materials, and common
sources, with resemblances which are merely accidental, or result from the
nature of the subject.1 7 3
In addition, Nimmer notes that Daly did not indicate whether
there must be expert dissection or analysis in considering the issue of
169. Id. at 13-49 (emphasis added and in original) (footnote omitted); see also Atari,
Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982); Harold
Lloyd Corp. v. Witmer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933); Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, 12 F. Supp. 632, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
170. 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552).
171. Id. at 1138 (emphasis added).
172. The derivation test was given its name by Alfred Shafter. A. SHAFTER, supra
note 1, at 170. It was first applied by Judge Learned Hand in Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc.,
234 F. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), and has been defined as follows:
The author's copyright is an absolute right to prevent others from copying his
original collocation of words or notes, and does -not depend upon the in-
fringer's good faith. Once it appears that another has in fact used the copy-
right as the source of his production, he has invaded the author's rights.
Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
173. Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1138 (citing Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.
1863) (No. 4,436)).
improper appropriation, as far as aural impressions are concerned. 174
The proper determination of whether improper appropriation exists
is a far greater concern than whether the lay listener can aurally per-
ceive the improper appropriation. Consequently, cases citing Daly as
the origin of the lay listener test have misinterpreted its precedent
and dictum.
Finally, opponents to the average lay listener test for musical copy-
right infringement cases staunchly assert that a member of the lay or
general public is incapable of accurately comparing two musical com-
positions. Indeed, the lay listener may recognize findings of infringe-
ment based on similarities which may in fact be attributable to
common sources, independent creation, or simply coincidence. On
the other hand, because of the unique nature of musical comparison,
real appropriation could go undetected.175 "[B]ecause of its impracti-
cability, [the lay listener test] has had an artificial and disappoint-
ingly inaccurate application .... Thus, the . . . [average lay listener
test] is acknowledged as inconclusive."176
VII. PROPOSALS
This comment has argued that: (1) traditionally, expert testimony
is widely accepted on the issue of copying in musical copyright in-
fringement litigation; and (2) although the trier of fact, sitting as a
lay listener, has decided the ultimate issue of substantial similarity
for over forty years, the lay listener test is not accepted as the most
logical or effective way to prove improper appropriation.
The use of expert testimony in musical copyright infringement liti-
gation should not be limited to the issue of copying as required by
Arnstein. Due to the impracticality of the Arnstein limitations, and
the misapplication of the Krofft idea-expression dichotomy test in
musical copyright infringement cases, expert testimony should be ad-
missible when considering the ultimate issue of substantial similarity
and whether copying is improper and, therefore, an infringement.
The Arnstein guidelines regarding the use of experts raise signifi-
cant questions as to the intention behind the limitation. The first is-
sue concerns whether the trier of fact, "exposed to expert evidence in
the first step [copying] .... [can] ignore or 'forget' that evidence in
analyzing the problem [raised] under the second step [improper ap-
propriation]."177 After witnessing the direct and cross-examinations
174. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.03[E], at 13-49.
175. Id. at 13-52.
176. Shipman v. R.K.O. Pictures, 100 F.2d 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1938). The court uses
the term "audience test" but actually intends the average lay listener test.
177. Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1986).
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of an expert, a trier of fact no longer hears the works as a lay lis-
tener, but instead as a listener who has been "exposed to critical
analysis."1 78 As a result, the trier of fact has already been influenced
by the expert opinion and, therefore, deprivation of continued expert
assistance is not logical.
Secondly, excluding expert testimony on the issue of improper ap-
propriation "precludes a meaningful evaluation of the quality and
quantity of similarities"'179 by the trier of fact. To find substantial
similarity under Arnstein, the trier of fact, as lay listener, has the
burden of finding actual substantial similarities. Because the trier
makes this judgment without the benefit of expert testimony, it is
questionable whether the trier can successfully distinguish between
similarities resulting from a common source, independent, or illicit
copying. The trier of fact, therefore, may favor the defendant by not
recognizing real appropriation or may favor the plaintiff by misiden-
tifying similarities which do not result from improper copying. The
supposed danger of causing confusion among the triers of factiSO with
expert testimony is surely outweighed by the increased knowledge
the trier of fact gains from the expert testimony. There is simply no
reason why expert testimony should not be considered in deciding
the issue of improper appropriation.
If the federal courts were to allow expert testimony on the issue of
improper appropriation, a question would arise as to whether the lay
listener test should be entirely eliminated. There would be argument
against this. As discussed previously, the improper application of the
reasonable person doctrine to copyright law and the misinterpreta-
tion of case law precedent have caused the lay listener test to be mis-
understood and, consequently, misused. The test, however, is not
completely devoid of merit. To understand the test's merit, it is im-
portant to understand its policy.
The copyright and patent clause of the United States Constitu-
tion 8 1 and the Copyright Act of 1976182 promote the creativity of au-
178. Metzger, supra note 39, at 91.
179. Note, supra note 8, at 146; see also Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 346 (1987) (when a small portion of one work is similar to an-
other and that similarity is qualitatively important, the trier of fact may find substan-
tial similarity); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (similarity of
an eight note ostinato in two compared works was sufficient to prove substantial
similarity).
180. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
181. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
182. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1976).
thors and inventors by protecting and rewarding their creativity. The
copyright and patent clause specifically encourages the free flow of
ideas by promoting creativity through the granting of monopoly sta-
tus, limited in time, which excludes others from using the works
without authority.I8 3 Consequently, authors and composers know
that they may create and publish works while securing federal pro-
tection from misuse which, in turn, encourages copyright owners to
sue for infringement.
Because published works are purchased by the public, the plaintiff
may suffer a potential loss of income from the public's purchase of
the defendant's work. Thus, because that defendant's work is sub-
stantially similar to, and misidentified as, the plaintiff's, much
credence is given to the existence of the lay listener test.
Judge Clark's dissent in Arnstein declares the use of an expert test
and the lay listener test as an unwelcome dichotomy within the evi-
dentiary process. 8 4 However, an expert may become so technical in
his musical comparison, that obvious similarities aurally recognized
by the lay ear may be overlooked if the lay listener test were com-
pletely abolished. In addition, some question remains as to whether
Judge Clark's dissent in Arnstein, emphasizing the incapability of the
untutored and illiterate lay listener, may be too intellectual an ap-
proach in deciding the issue of improper appropriation. 185 The lay
listener test is bolstered by the belief that, despite the unique nature
of an art form such as music, the "question of infringement . . .
should be determined by the very people who comprise the audience
for which it is composed."'18 6
Consequently, complete elimination of the lay listener test may
not, in fact, be the most effective solution. Instead, perhaps a com-
promise may be devised through the implementation of a more com-
prehensive use of expert testimony, as discussed above, and a
refinement of the lay listener test.
Federal courts generally have applied what is called the "ordinary
observer [and in musical infringement cases, the ordinary listener] or
audience test."18 7 The courts have not clearly indicated whether the
terms "lay listener test" and "audience test" are synonymous, or
whether the average lay listener, being a member of the general pub-
lic, differs from the plaintiff's actual audience.' 8 8
This comment contends that a distinction clearly exists between an
183. Harper and Row Publishers v. National Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
184. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
185. Orth, supra note 28, at 252-53.
186. Id. at 253.
187. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.03[E], at 13-47 (emphasis added); see also
Metzger, supra note 39, at 71.
188. See supra note 15.
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ordinary lay person and an actual member of the plaintiff's audience.
The "audience test" is, therefore, not synonymous with the lay lis-
tener test. A member of the plaintiff's audience differs from a hypo-
thetical lay listener who is found as a member of the general public,
sitting as the trier of fact. An audience test clearly "restrict[s] the
spectator reactions used in the substantial similarity determination to
those of the works' audience."'18 9
A musical composition within a certain genre, such as classical,
country western, new age, or jazz, may sound indistinguishable to an
individual unfamiliar with that style of music and a particular artist
within that style. The reaction of an individual who is familiar with
a style of music "is a more valid indicator of substantial similarity
than that of the ordinary [listener]."190 "The ear moves beyond sur-
face similarities to hear more subtle distinctions."191 It is within this
area of subtle distinctions that an alleged musical copyright infringer
works to camouflage his composition.
If the plaintiff's actual audience is used to decide improper appro-
priation and "is composed of people who possess significantly special-
ized tastes, skills, or knowledge, as compared with those of the
general public,"192 then the trier of fact should no longer assume the
role of a lay listener. Instead, the trier of fact should receive eviden-
tiary testimony from a sampling of the actual audience of the plain-
tifff's music.
One author has proposed a method which identifies the plaintiff's
intended audience and distinguishes it from the general public.193
One consideration is the medium of expression, e.g., books, television,
motion pictures, or sound recordings, used to communicate the plain-
tiff's work to the audience.194 A second consideration is the audi-
ence's subject matter taste, e.g., popular music, science fiction, or
189: Copyright Infringement Actions, supra note 158, at 386 (emphasis in original);
see also Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. i031 (1986) (citing Copyright Infringement Actions, supra note
158, at 386) ("criticizing lay observer standard when objects in question are intended
for particular, identifiable audiences"); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443, 454
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
190. Comment, Substantial Similarity Between Video Games: An Old Copyright
Problem in a New Medium, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1290 n.91 (1983).
191. Comment, supra note 5, at 428.
192. Copyright Infringement Actions, supra note 158, at 386.
193. See generally id. at 404-07.
194. Id. at 406.
comedy.195
In truth, a true audience test, consisting of an actual audience of
the musical works being considered, more closely parallels the goals
of copyright protection.196 A member of the plaintiff's actual audi-
ence is more likely to purchase the plaintiff's work than the average
lay listener. Even if a purchase is not made, the actual audience
member still is likely to be more familiar with the plaintiff's work
than the trier of fact sitting as an average lay listener.
An actual audience test narrows the field of individuals who are
qualified to compare the two musical works for substantial similar-
ity.197 Narrowing the lay listener test to an actual audience test
causes the individuals considering improper appropriation to be rep-
resentative of a "distinct and significant consumer group."198
VIII. CONCLUSION
"Music is a highly technical yet often imprecise field."199 In addi-
tion, as its financial stakes have risen, the music industry has become
a significant player in the world of copyright infringement. Copy-
right law must adapt to the unique nature of music and its industry
so that the law may continue to offer the protection which artistic
and music creators expect.
This comment has addressed the unique nature of music and the
inadequacy of the copyright law, as set out in both Arnstein and
Krofft, to effectively provide a composer with the rights to which he
is entitled. Under the current test for musical copyright infringe-
ment, the use of expert testimony is confined to the issue of copying.
Such testimony is inadmissible on the issue of whether the com-
plaining and allegedly infringing work are so substantially similar as
to constitute improper appropriation. The trier of fact, assuming the
position of a hypothetical lay listener, decides this ultimate issue of
infringement.
195. Id.; accord, Orth, supra note 28, at 253-54 (recognizing the need to narrow the
audience).
196. Copyright Infringement Actions, supra note 158, at 394.
197. One critic advocates that the audience test be clearly distinguished from the
lay observer test "whenever the audience is composed of people who possess signifi-
cantly specialized tastes, skills, or knowledge, as compared to those of the general pub-
lic." Id. at 386. Another commentator states that "the average person who attends
symphony concerts is no more a musical expert than is the person who enjoys attend-
ing trials a legal expert." Metzger, supra note 39, at 94.
198. Copyright Infringement Actions, supra note 158, at 411; see Note, Copyright
Infringement of Computer Programs. A Modijication of the Substantial Similarity
Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1285-88 (1984). "The ordinary observer test... is of doubt-
ful value in cases involving computer programs on account of the programs' complex-
ity and unfamiliarity to most members of the public." Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow
Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1986).
199. Comment, supra note 5, at 464.
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Recognizing the necessity to modify the test used to prove musical
copyright infringement, this comment advocates the use of expert
dissection and analysis on the issue of improper appropriation. If ex-
perts were allowed to testify on this issue, increased reliability in the
outcome of the litigation would occur as the trier of fact would be
less likely to overlook the similarities between two works or to be
otherwise misled.
Due to the underlying economic philosophy of copyright law,
which intimates that copyright protection exists to provide a creator
with the economic incentive to create, it is unrealistic to expect the
complete replacement of the lay listener test with expert testimony
on the issue of improper appropriation. Consequently, the combina-
tion of expert testimony and a refined "actual audience" test, as pre-
viously outlined, provides a feasible solution to the outdated and
impractical application of the Arnstein standards to musical copy-
right infringement litigation.
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